Syria Defence and Security Report Q1 2008
Published By: Business Monitor International
February 2008
R302-1325
Online Download $495.00
Description
The beginnings of a potential turn in Syria’s diplomatic and defence positioning in the Middle East began
to be seen in Q407. At the end of the preceding quarter an Israeli air strike on unidentified Syrian
facilities - rumoured to be part of some kind of North Korean-supported nuclear programme - appeared
to point to more of the same old strategic isolation for the country, as part of an ‘axis of evil’ (in Bushspeak)
or, alternatively as an uncompromising anti-Zionist pole (Ahmadinejad-speak). Yet to the
contrary, no sooner had the dust settled on the military action than a process of rapprochement began. A
key milestone was Washington’s decision to invite Syria to participate in the opening of the Middle East
peace conference held in Annapolis on November 27 and 28. The US government changed the agenda, to
formally include the Israeli-Syria Golan Heights dispute, so as to secure Syrian participation. In a separate
but also significant initiative, Russia said it was planning a separate mediating role in early 2008 to
promote Israel-Syria negotiations over the Heights.
A series of other developments contributed to the diplomatic opening. US military leaders in Iraq
acknowledged in Q407 that the flow of jihadists from across the Syrian border - volunteer fighters who
join the anti-US insurgency - had begun to dwindle. While Syria’s interventionist stance in Lebanese
politics had not fundamentally changed, a number of Western governments hailed what they saw as a new
willingness to act as a moderating influence and broker a deal on the Lebanese presidency. The Wall
Street Journal quoted a ‘senior Israeli official’ in November saying that ‘this is one of those moments in
history where the Syrians have been given an opportunity to jump. If they do jump, they will be
embraced’. One motive behind these moves was said to be Washington’s desire to drive a wedge between
Syria and Iran, as part of its ongoing strategy of isolating the Tehran government. Damascus in the
meantime seemed to be welcoming the new diplomatic opening without giving up any of its key foreign
policy positions, including its alliance with Tehran and its support for Hizbullah in Lebanon.
The Syrian armed forces have declined in terms of both capabilities and equipment of late, as US
sanctions and subsequent cash shortfalls have forced the government to reduce its military spending.
Military expenditure in Syria is low, having not increased in recent years. Syria lacks an established
indigenous defence industry of significance, and its armed forces are almost entirely dependent upon
procurement from overseas. This reliance has led to the Syrian armed forces being left under-equipped
and reliant on obsolete, ageing equipment, with the government unable to procure modern hardware due
to economic restrictions and internationally imposed arms trade sanctions. This scenario is unlikely to
change in the near future given Syria’s weak economy and current poor relations with the majority of the
international community. However, a recently signed strategic accord with Iran could see financial and
technological investment in the Syrian defence industry. Syrian arms imports generally originate from
anti-US states such as North Korea and Iran, while other suppliers are very limited given the extensive
embargoes placed upon states exporting arms to Syria. The re-emergence of Russia as a potential supplier
of arms to Syria may prove to stimulate its arms import trade and address the issue of Syria’s depleted
armed forces through the supply and upgrade of its hardware. However, the process will be both slow and
limited, as Moscow will be well aware of probable international condemnations of such liaisons. Syria
itself does not have the surplus equipment or the production facilities to be able to export arms overseas.
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Table of Contents
- Executive Summary
- SWOT Analysis
- Syria Political SWOT
- Syria Security SWOT
- Syria Defence Industry SWOT
- Political Overview
- Domestic Political Outlook
- Damascus Comes in from the Cold?
- Diplomacy Remains Most Likely Outcome
- Presidential Election: Key Implications
- Kurds and Way Forward
- Foreign Relations
- New Initiative on the Golan Heights
- Compromise Deal on Lebanese Presidency?
- Just One Little Problem…
- Security Risk Ratings
- BMI’s Security Ratings
- Risk Ratings
- Table: Middle East & North Africa Defence & Security Ratings
- Table: Middle East & North Africa: State Terrorism Vulnerability Index
- Regional Security: The Middle East and North Africa
- Inter-State Conflicts
- Internal Conflicts
- Syria Security Risk Ratings
- Syria Conflict Risk
- Syria Terrorism Risk
- Syria Physical Safety Risk
- Security Risk Overview
- External Security Situation
- US Regional Presence
- Israel
- Turkey and Jordan
- Lebanon
- Internal Security Situation
- The Iraqi Refugee Issue
- Facebook Veiled?
- Domestic Unrest
- Jund al-Sham
- Islamist Revival?
- Military Structure & Defence Industry
- Armed Forces
- Table: Regional Armed Forces (including conscripted) 2007
- Current Strength
- International Deployments
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Market Structure
- Arms Trade Overview
- Imports
- Exports
- Procurement Trends & Developments
- Industry Forecast Scenario
- Table: Syria Defence Sector - Historical Data & Forecasts
- Mutual Assistance
- Key Risks to BMI’s Forecast Scenario
- Macroeconomic Forecast
- Declining Oil Sector Forces Growth Rates Down
- Risks To Outlook
- Table: Syria - Economic Activity
- BMI Forecast Modelling
- How we generate our industry forecasts
- Defence Industry
- Sources
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